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McCRAY v. ABRAM&. AN END TO ABUSE
OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE?
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution man-
dates that a criminal defendant be tried by an impartial jury.1 To
ensure this result, most states have devised a system whereby both
the prosecution and the defense counsel may, during the voir dire,2
challenge the selection of potential jurors if it can be shown that
such jurors harbor biases that may prevent them from deciding the
case impartially. 3 However, because counsel may detect certain bi-
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides, in part: "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.. ." Id.
2 See M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: THE LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER 487
(1969). During the stage of jury selection known as the voir dire, prospective jurors are
examined, collectively or individually, by the parties or by the court. Id. The goal of voir
dire is the discovery of bias. See, e.g., People v. Boulware, 29 N.Y.2d 135, 139, 272 N.E.2d
538, 540, 324 N.Y.S.2d 30, 32 (1971) (voir dire necessary so challenges may be intelligently
used to remove biased jurors), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972); cf. State v. Brown, 240 S.C.
357, 365-66, 126 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1962) (voir dire examination guaranty of right to impartial jury;
failure to allow voir dire constitutes reversible error).
Not every jurisdiction gives the parties an absolute right to examine the potential ju-
rors, who are also known as veniremen. See M. BAssiouN, supra, at 487 (depending on state
law, voir dire may be conducted by parties or court). In federal court, examination may be
conducted by the parties or the court itself, according to the court's discretion. FED. R. CrM.
P. 24(a); see, e.g., United States v. Rankin, 572 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (trial
judge has discretion to conduct voir dire without allowing counsel to question veniremen),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 979 (1978); see also United States v. Shavers, 615 F.2d 266, 268 (5th
Cir. 1980) (discretion under federal rule includes discretion not to submit questions sug-
gested by counsel to jury). Approximately 10 states follow the federal rule, 10 restrict exami-
nation to the trial judge, 22 allow both judge and counsel to question veniremen, and the
rest allow only counsel to conduct the examination. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTIcE: STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 63
(Tent. Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY]; see, e.g.,
People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 824, 506 P.2d 193, 197, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (1973) (en
banc) (court will uphold any method of voir dire that results in reasonable examination);
Commonwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 201 N.E.2d 504, 508 (1964) (parties need not be
permitted to interview jurors), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965); People v. Goode, 78 Mich.
App. 781, 783-84, 261 N.W.2d 47, 48 (1977) (trial judge has discretion to conduct voir dire
himself).
' State ex rel. Freeman v. Ponder, 234 N.C. 294, 302, 67 S.E.2d 292, 298 (1951); see,
e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15(2) (McKinney 1982) (statute permits challenge for
cause). Challenge for cause requires a designated reason. Ponder, 234 N.C. at 302, 67 S.E.2d
at 298; see also Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 2, 31 (N.Y. 1847) (challenge for cause must
specify grounds of challenge, otherwise it will not be considered by court).
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ases that are not actually demonstrable, state criminal procedures
often allot to each side a certain number of peremptory challenges
that traditionally have been used to remove persons from the ve-
nire without cause or explanation. The use of such challenges by
prosecutors has been perceived as a means of eliminating minority
groups from the venire and has been attacked as a violation of a
criminal defendant's sixth amendment implied right to a fair trial
by a representative cross-section of the community.5 Although the
Most states have set forth specific grounds upon which challenge for cause may be
granted. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 68 (Approved Draft 1968). These grounds
generally include factors such as actual bias, lack of qualification to sit as a juror, lack of
sound mind, prior service as a juror, blood relation to defendant, or status as a party ad-
verse to defendant in a civil action. See 3 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§
447-461 (12th ed. 1975); see also N.Y. CrIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1982) (grounds
for challenge for cause). Once a challenge for cause is allowed, the prospective juror must be
excluded from service. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(2) (McKinney 1982); cf. M. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 2, at 487 ("[flailure of the court to discharge a juror challenged for adequate
cause will be grounds for mistrial"). Both sides may challenge an unlimited number of jurors
for cause, subject to the court's recognition that such cause exists. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY
SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 140
(1977); Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality
and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 340 (1982); see also Note, Peremptory
Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177, 1179 (1980) (no
limit to challenge for cause).
' E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965); M. BASSIOUNi, supra note 2, at 487;
J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 139; see, e.g., Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 83, 628 S.W.2d 284,
290 (explanation unnecessary when veniremen stricken peremptorily), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
882 (1982); People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 593, 12 N.W.2d 466, 473 (1943) (prosecu-
tor's reasons for peremptory challenge immaterial), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 749 (1944); see
also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982) (no reason need be assigned for pe-
remptory challenge).
By its nature, the peremptory challenge is used "without a reason stated, without in-
quiry and without being subject to the court's control." Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. It is "an
arbitrary and capricious species of challenge... [used]... without showing any cause at
all.. ." 4 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES 353. It is especially useful when an attorney sus-
pects that a potential juror is being biased but cannot prove it. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note
3, at 146.
6 See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit
Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1724 (1977). See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 145-69
(discussing impact of Swain on peremptory challenges). In 1965, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the matter of the unrestricted peremptory challenge. See Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Swain, an all-white jury convicted a black man for the rape of
a white woman. Id. at 203. The prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to exclude six
black veniremen. See id. at 205. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Alabama
prosecutor's challenges, declaring that "[t]he essential nature of the peremptory challenge is
that it is one exercised without a reason stated .... " Id. at 220. Four justices speculated,
however, that if the prosecutor had systematically, in case after case, excluded all black
jurors through peremptory challenges, the defendant might have prima facie proof of a con-
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federal courts have almost uniformly upheld the indiscriminate use
of peremptory challenges absent a showing of "systematic exclu-
sion" of minorities from the venire,6 several state courts have be-
gun to interpret their state constitutions as affording greater pro-
tection to the criminal defendant in this area.7
stitutional violation. See id. at 223-24 (dictum); id. at 228 (Harlan, J., concurring). A dissent
by Justice Goldberg suggested that once the defendant had presented a prima facie case of
systematic exclusion, the burden should shift to the state to prove that the incident was an
isolated one. Id. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Commentators have criticized Swain for
imposing too harsh a burden of proof on the defendant. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory
Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1982); see, e.g., Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531,
540 (1970) (Swain standard implies Court would "wink an eye" at discriminatory chal-
lenges) [hereinafter cited as The Case for Black Juries]; Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A
Constitutional Blueprint for Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157, 1160
(1966) (Swain sanctions use of procedural device to perpetuate control of southern judicial
machinery by white majority). In fact, few defendants have been able to meet the burden in
subsequent state or federal trials. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th
Cir. 1975) (defendant's argument rejected despite statistical proof that high percentage of
blacks challenged in fifteen cases), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v.
Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065, 1066-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (systematic exclusion requires proof of
pattern extending over series of cases; prosecutor's statement that he "make[s] it a practice"
to exclude jurors of defendants' ethnic background insufficient), afl'd, 620 F.2d 286 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878 (1980); Rogers v. State, 257 Ark. 144, 148, 515 S.W.2d 79, 83
(1974) (examination of voir dire transcript revealed other possible reasons for challenges),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975); State v. Booker, 517 S.W.2d 937, 939-41 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974) (statistical evidence insufficient); see also Note, supra, at 1723 n.36 (no violations
found in federal courts after Swain).
The use of peremptory challenges in state courts has been blamed for the exclusion of
blacks from southern juries. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 150; Kuhn, Jury Discrimina-
tion: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. RE V. 235, 283 (1968) (peremptory challenge used to bar
blacks who manage to get past other discriminatory jury-selection procedures); Comment, A
Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due
Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662, 665-66 (1974) (peremptory challenge allows majority whites
to exclude minority blacks from jury service) [hereinafter cited as Case Study].
" See, e.g., United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360, 1366 (8th Cir. 1974) (government has
no burden of showing lack of systematic exclusion in case at hand); United States v. Ming,
466 F.2d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir.) (absent proof of systematic exclusion, peremptory challenge
of only two black veniremen did not deny defendant due process), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915
(1972); United States v. Carlton, 456 F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 1972) (prosecutor's subjective
reasons for use of peremptory challenge within one case are beyond inquiry). But see Mc-
Cray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1131 (2d. Cir. 1984) (prosecutor's discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenge within one case violation of sixth amendment and can be blocked by
defendant).
7 Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 3, at 337-38; see, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 277, 583 P.2d 748, 763, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). In Wheeler, two black men
accused of murdering a white were convicted by an all-white jury after the California prose-
cutor peremptorily challenged every black on the venire. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 262-63,
583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. The court distinguished "case-specific bias" and
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Recently, in McCray v. Abrams," the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that under the federal constitution a
criminal defendant may block the unbridled use of peremptory
challenges by the prosecution if it can be shown that such chal-
lenges have been used in a specific case for the purpose of elimi-
nating racial minorities from the jury.'
In McCray, a white art student was assaulted and robbed by
three black men in Brooklyn, New York.1" The defendant, Michael
McCray, originally was tried in a New York state court by a jury
composed of nine whites and three blacks.1 The trial ended in a
hung jury, which allegedly split along racial lines. 2 At the second
"group bias," holding that although peremptory challenges could properly be used to elimi-
nate biases that related specifically to the defendant being tried, the elimination of "the
diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences" constituted a viola-
tion of the California constitution, which guaranteed a party's right to an impartial jury. See
id. at 274-78, 583 P.2d at 760-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901-03; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. In Soares,
three black men were charged with the murder of a white Harvard University student dur-
ing a racially motivated incident. See 377 Mass. at 462-63, 465-70, 387 N.E.2d at 502, 504-
06. During the voir dire, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged twelve black jurors. Id. at
473, 387 N.E.2d at 508. Although the prosecutor had not exhausted his peremptory chal-
lenges, one black man was seated on the petit jury as foreman. Id. Following the reasoning
of Wheeler, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Massachusetts con-
stitution barred the use of peremptories to exclude veniremen "solely by virtue of their
membership in, or affiliation with, particular defined groupings in the community." Id. at
486, 387 N.E.2d at 515. But see People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 138-39, 457 N.E.2d 1202,
1204 (1983) (peremptory challenge of prospective black jurors allowed provided there is no
systematic exclusion of blacks), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 447 (1985); People v. McCray, 57
N.Y.2d 542, 548-50, 443 N.E.2d 915, 918-19, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (1982) (prosecutor's mo-
tives for striking jurors not subject to scrutiny based upon assertions by defense that pe-
remptory challenges are being used to exclude minorities), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
One New York appellate court attempted to use the reasoning of the California and Massa-
chusetts courts. See People v. Thompson, 79 App. Div. 2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (2d Dep't
1981). In Thompson, the Appellate Division held that the New York constitution barred the
use of peremptory challenges based on race. See id. at 106, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 752; N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 1. However, Thompson appears to have been overruled sub silentio by People v.
McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 961
(1983); see infra note 15 and accompanying text.
8 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
9 Id. at 1115.
10 Id. In McCray, a student at Pratt Institute had just withdrawn cash from an auto-
matic bank teller machine when his assailants pushed him into a doorway and took the cash
at gunpoint. People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 544, 443 N.E.2d 915, 916, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441,
442 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983), later proceeding, McCray v. Abrams, 576 F.
Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
* See 750 F.2d at 1115.
12 Id. at 1115-18. Defense counsel at the second McCray trial alleged that the three
acquitting votes at the first trial were cast by the three black jurors. Id. at 1116. However,
the prosecutor, who had represented the state in both trials, insisted that one of the votes
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trial, the prosecutor used eight of her eleven peremptory chal-
lenges to remove seven blacks and one hispanic from the jury."
Subsequently, McCray was convicted before an all-white jury.1 4
McCray's conviction was twice affirmed on appeal, 15 and his peti-
tion for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court.16 However, the Federal District Court granted habeas
corpus relief, reversing the defendant's conviction on the ground
that "the sixth amendment prohibit[ed] the prosecution's use of
challenges to discriminate on the basis of race. 1 7 On appeal, a Sec-
ond Circuit panel agreed that McCray had made a prima facie
showing that the prosecutorial challenges were discriminatory, but
remanded the case to afford the state an opportunity to rebut that
showing.1 8
Writing for the majority, Judge Kearse determined that the
sixth amendment barred the states from denying a defendant the
possibility of a jury that represented a "fair cross-section of the
community."'19 The majority recognized that when there is a con-
was cast by a white juror. Id. at 1118.
" Id. at 1116.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1115-16. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion, see People v. Mc-
Cray, 84 App. Div. 2d 769, 444 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dep't 1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443
N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983), later proceeding, McCray
v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
McCray's conviction by a 4 to 3 vote, relying on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See
57 N.Y.2d 542, 544-50, 443 N.E.2d 915, 916-19, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442-45; see generally
supra note 5.
" See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). The denial of certiorari was accompa-
nied by two opinions in which a total of five justices indicated that the Court may soon
grant certiorari to a case of this type. Id. at 961-70. In fact, the Court subsequently granted
certiorari to a case from the Supreme Court of Kentucky. See Batson v. Kentucky, 105 S.Ct.
2111 (1985).
1 See McCray v. Abrans, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Influenced by the
Supreme Court, id. at 1246; see supra note 16, Judge Nickerson ruled that the sixth amend-
ment required judicial scrutiny of peremptory challenges that appeared to have been used
discriminatorily. McCray, 576 F. Supp. at 1249. Judge Nickerson's reasoning closely fol-
lowed that of the California and Massachusetts courts in Wheeler and Soares. See supra
note 7.
" McCray, 750 F.2d at 1118, 1134-35. On appeal, the state conceded that the use of
peremptory challenges to eliminate potential jurors on the basis of race was unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 1118. The state argued merely that McCray had not established a prima facie
case of such a violation, and that it should have been granted a hearing to rebut his allega-
tion. Id. The Second Circuit adopted much of the reasoning of the district court, but agreed
that the state should have been given another opportunity to prove that its challenges were
not used unconstitutionally. Id.
9 Id. at 1129. The McCray court distinguished Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
on the ground that Swain was decided under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
1985]
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flict between the statutory right to use peremptory challenges and
a constitutional right, the latter must be supreme.2 0 The majority
held that the defendant could make out a prima facie case of un-
constitutionality by showing that the persons excluded belonged to
a distinctive group in the community, and that it was substantially
likely that their membership in the group was the sole reason for
exclusion by the prosecutor. 21 The court concluded that once such
a prima facie case is established, the state must give reasons for its
peremptory challenges.2 2 Judge Kearse explained that such reasons
could be something less than "cause," and that any genuine pur-
pose for exclusion other than group-based affiliation would suffice
to rebut defendant's prima facie showing.
23
Dissenting, Judge Meskill argued that the majority's attempt
to create a middle ground between the traditional peremptory
challenge and a challenge for cause was unworkable. 4 The dissent
maintained that compelling the prosecution to provide a nonracial
motivation for its peremptory challenges would undermine the use-
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1118-19, 1123-24. Since
Swain, noted the court, the impartial jury guarantee has been held to apply to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 1124; see also
infra notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text.
20 McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130.
2 Id. at 1131-32. The McCray court adopted part of the test developed in Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), for a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination in
the formation of the venire. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. Duren requires that the defendant
show that the persons excluded formed a cognizable group, that the representation of this
group on the venire was not reasonably proportional to their number within the community,
and that this underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion by the state. See id. The
Second Circuit held that the second requirement - proportional representation - did not
apply to the petit jury stage. McCray, 752 F.2d at 1129, 1131. However, the first and third
requirements, asserted the court, could function to ensure the defendant the ability to chal-
lenge any attempt by the prosecutor to systematically deny the defendant the possibility of
a cross-sectional jury. Id. at 1131-32.
22 750 F.2d at 1132. The defendant's prima facie case, said Judge Kearse, consisted of
two parts. The defendant must establish that the group allegedly excluded by the prosecu-
tor is a "cognizable group" within the community and he must show that there was a "sub-
stantial likelihood" that the challenges were used to exclude the potential jurors because of
their membership in the group, and not for any suspicion of bias. See id. at 1131-32.
23 Id. at 1132. The court stated that the prosecutor need give only genuine reasons
other than group affiliation for the challenges. Id.
24 Id. at 1135 (Meskill, J., dissenting). The McCray dissent asserted that the decision
was contrary to precedent in almost every other circuit and in the Second Circuit itself. Id.
at 1136 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Judge Meskill criticized the majority's departure from
Swain, and argued that Supreme Court decisions regarding the sixth amendment did not
demonstrate such a departure. Id. at 1136-37 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
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fulness of such challenges in securing an impartial jury.26 The dis-
senting judge predicted that the adoption of the majority's solution
would eventually lead to conferral of a similar right on the prose-
cution, with the result that criminal defendants would ultimately
enjoy less safeguards than they did prior to McCray2
Although the McCray court has incorporated sixth amend-
ment principles into the latter stages of the jury selection process,
it is submitted that the court has failed to consider the practical
difficulties of imposing its suggested procedures on the present pe-
remptory challenge system. This Comment will analyze the recent
development of the defendant's right to prevent the prosecutor
from abusing the peremptory challenge, and the McCray court's
impact on this development. After examining current proposals for
changing the challenge system, this Comment will propose a solu-
tion that preserves the defendant's sixth amendment rights and
maintains the integrity of the peremptory challenge.
CHALLENGING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The McCray court recognized that peremptory challenges, in
theory, should enable the parties to create a jury that is free from
non-demonstrable, case-specific biases. 7 Indeed, when each side
has an equal number of challenges, each side ideally has the same
ability to eliminate jurors that, for whatever reason, appear likely
to favor the opposition.28 In reality, however, the prosecutor often
22 Id. at 1137-38 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 1138-39 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 1119; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (function of chal-
lenge is to eliminate bias and ensure verdict based on evidence). The challenge should allow
parties to "eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides." Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. Chal-
lenge for cause is usually too narrow to remove all jurors suspected of bias; the peremptory
challenge is used to eliminate those for whom cause cannot be shown. Saltzburg & Powers,
supra note 3, at 340.
" See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). The system should secure freedom
from bias for both prosecution and defense. Id. Most states give both sides the same number
of challenges. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 2, at 75; see also N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25(2) (McKinney 1982) (each side given same specified number of
challenges, which number depends on severity of crime).
Peremptory challenges are generally used to eliminate those veniremen suspected of
leaning toward a verdict for the other party. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d
240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977) (prosecutor struck jurors because he believed doing so would lessen
risk of bias in favor of accused); see also J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 146 (jurors suspected
of being unfavorably disposed toward a party due to group affiliation can be challenged
peremptorily).
19851
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has an inherent numerical advantage over a minority defendant. 29
Given a venire that is a representative cross-section of the commu-
nity,30 the prosecutor has little difficulty eliminating all minority
members from the jury. 1
The Supreme Court addressed this imbalance in Swain v. Ala-
bama,32 which involved racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by a local prosecutor.3 The Supreme Court held that
there is a presumption in any given case that the prosecutor is us-
ing his or her peremptory challenges to obtain an impartial jury.34
A defendant could only establish a claim of unconstitutionality if it
could be shown that the state had systematically excluded every
member of a distinctive group from the petit jury over a period of
time.35
Swain was decided on equal protection grounds.36 The focus of
the Court's concern was on the right of cognizable groups to par-
ticipate in the judicial process, not on the right of the individual
defendant to a jury from which no distinctive group had been ex-
cluded.3 7 Thus, a defendant was required to show that the discrim-
11 See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 154. If each side has a number of challenges
greater than the number of minorities on the venire, it is possible for the prosecutor to
eliminate the minorities. Id. In the southern states, the numerical problem is readily appar-
ent as the number of whites on the venire is generally larger than the defendant's number of
challenges. See Case Study, supra note 5, at 666.
1o See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (all litigants entitled to venire
selected from cross-section of community).
"' See supra note 29.
s2 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
3 Id. at 210-11.
"' Id. at 222. The Court held that any inquiry into the motives behind a prosecutor's
use of peremptories within a single case would change the essential nature of the challenge.
Id. at 221-22. Exercised without judicial control, the peremptory challenge allowed both
parties to challenge jurors "in light of the limited knowledge counsel has of them." Id. at
221. This freedom, the Court held, gave parties the ability to excuse jurors for any "real or
imagined partiality." Id. at 220.
"8 Id. at 223-24. The Court declared that if the state did not leave a single black venire-
man on any jury in any criminal case, "it [might] appear that the purposes of the peremp-
tory challenge [were] being perverted." Id. However, the Court made it clear that such a
"perversion" would occur only when blacks were excluded for purposes "wholly unrelated"
to the specific trial, so that the result would be a denial of the rights of blacks as a group to
participate in the judicial process. Id. at 224.
-6 Id. at 206, 221.
11 Id. at 224. The Court was concerned that the states not be allowed to "deny the
Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed
by the white population." Id. This situation, said the Court, would "raise[] a different issue"
from that of the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges within the defendant's trial. Id.
at 223.
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inatory use of peremptory challenges was so uniform that it cre-
ated an inference that, through unequal application, the
peremptory challenge statute itself constituted a denial of equal
protection. 8 Consequently, after Swain, it was only in exceptional
cases that a defendant was able to defeat the prosecutor's
challenges. 3
Swain has been criticized for its failure to provide the defen-
dant with a weapon against discriminatory prosecutorial chal-
lenges.40 It has become clear that something more is required to
protect the defendant from prosecutorial "perversion" of the chal-
lenge process.
In the years since Swain was decided, the Supreme Court has
extended the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by impartial
jury to state criminal trials,42 and has applied the guarantee to a
38 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTIruTIoNAL LAW 587 (2d ed. 1983).
Equal protection analysis centers on state-sponsored, legislative actions. Id. When a statute,
such as a peremptory challenge statute, is non-discriminatory on its face, a defendant must
show that it is being applied in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 600. The defendant is re-
quired to prove that the persons charged with administration of the law are employing a
suspect form of classification, with the result that for practical purposes, the classification is
established within the law. Id. at 601; see, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)
(municipal ordinance regulating operation of public laundries, applied solely to Chinese
launderers, held violation of equal protection).
31 See, e.g., State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (La. 1979); Brown v. State, 371
So. 2d 751, 754 (La. 1979). In Washington, although one black was seated after the prosecu-
tor ran out of peremptory challenges, the court reversed the defendant's conviction on the
basis of uncontradicted testimony by three defense attorneys that, in their experience, the
prosecutor challenged jurors on a discriminatory basis. 375 So. 2d at 1163.
In Brown, the defendant succeeded in challenging the prosecutor's peremptories by in-
troducing the testimony of two defense attorneys and judicial records of the composition of
other juries within the parish where the trial was held. 371 So. 2d at 752-53.
It is submitted that the ability of a defendant to meet the Swain test depends more
upon the attitude of the court than the strength of the evidence of discrimination. Indeed,
the defense in Swain presented evidence at least as strong as that produced in Washington
and Brown. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 231-32 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("no Negro within the
memory of persons now living has ever served on any petit jury in any civil or criminal case
tried in Talladega County. .. ").
40 See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 151, 156. (Swain test virtually impossible to
prove); Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory
Challenge, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1770, 1770-71 (1979) (prosecutors' challenges against minorities
immune from equal protection scrutiny); The Case for Black Juries, supra note 5, at 540
(Swain approach deficient because most cases brought to defend interest of individual de-
fendant, not group excluded); Case Study, supra note 5, at 666 (Court preferred procedural
device over constitutional right).
"I See supra note 39.
42 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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range of state jury selection procedures. 43 The concept has devel-
oped through a series of sixth amendment cases that juries should
reflect a "cross-section of the community," so that an adequate
hedge is provided against abuse of authority by prosecutors,
judges, or specific "privileged" groups within the community.44 Un-
til McCray, however, the cross-section requirement had been ap-
plied only to state statutes regulating the process of selecting the
venire.45 In McCray, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
extended existing sixth amendment analysis to the petit jury.46
The court reasoned that the effort to prevent states from excluding
persons from the venire on the basis of group affiliation is impor-
tant only because the defendant has a right to a petit jury that is
as near an approximation to a cross-section of the community as
possible.47 Therefore, the defendant had standing to question the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges whenever it appeared that they
were being used to exclude members of a particular group within
the context of his own case.48
It is submitted that the McCray court's extension of the sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury to the peremptory challenge
process, although a logical extension of sixth amendment prece-
4' See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367 (1979) (exemption of women on re-
quest constituted systematic exclusion, violating cross-sectional requirement); Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1978) (jury of five too small to provide adequate cross-sec-
tion); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (inclusion of women only on request
violation of requirement); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411-12 (1972) (unanimous ver-
dict not required by sixth amendment); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970) (ju-
ries of less than twelve permissible).
" See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-233 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). The Williams court held that the jury must re-
present a "cross-section of the community" to function as a source of common sense judge-
ment of laymen. 399 U.S. at 100. In Ballew, the Court held that a five person jury was too
small to fulfill this purpose. 435 U.S. at 245; see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-
11 (1972) (to come to common sense judgement, jury must consist of cross-sectional repre-
sentation of laymen of community). In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Court
applied the concept of cross-sectionality to a state statute which operated to exclude women
from venires. Id. at 530. The Court stated that "if [women] are systematically eliminated
from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satis-
fied." Id. at 531.
45 See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1128.
46 Id. at 1128-29.
47 Id.
46 Id. at 1130. Because the sixth amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury
in all criminal cases, the defendant need not meet the heavy burden of proof of systematic
exclusion required under the equal protection analysis of Swain. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI;
McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130.
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dent, not only fails to solve the problem of racial use of challenges,
but creates new problems that will plague the courts in their ef-
forts to create impartial juries.
It is suggested that the basic flaw in McCray is the require-
ment that the prosecutor give a reason for challenges questioned
by the defendant. Whenever a reason must be given, the challenge
becomes less than peremptory.49 Its value as an effective tool in the
jury selection process is nullified because its use is limited by the
discretion of the trial judge. Similarly, because the sufficiency of
the reason given by the prosecutor depends upon the judgment of
the trial judge, the possibility exists that in some courts any "rea-
son" proffered by the prosecutor will suffice, while in others none
will do. 1 Thus, the McCray court's solution could in some cases
mean nothing at all, while in others it could amount to a total de-
struction of the peremptory challenge.2
Various proposals to rectify the recognized abuses inherent in
4' Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965); see also United States v. Pearson, 448
F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1971) (questioning of counsel's thought processes inconsistent with
peremptory challenge system); King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 496 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (difficult to preserve peremptory challenge and still require reason for its use); J. VAN
DYKE, supra note 3, at 146 ("peremptories are truly arbitrary and can be made purely on the
attorney's intuition"); cf. Note, People v. Payne and the Prosecution's Peremptory Chal-
lenges: Will They be Preempted? 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 399, 422-23 (1983) (judicial inquiry
will inhibit voir dire).
If it can be said that the requirement of a reason destroys the effective utility of the
peremptory challenge, then it follows that the McCray court's extension of the right to in-
quiry to only the defense leaves the defense with a strong opportunity to create a jury likely
to acquit. Cf. Note, Peremptory Challenge - Divining Rod for a Sympathetic Jury?, 21
CATH. LAW. 56, 57 (1975) (prosecutors complain that defense counsel use sophisticated tech-
niques to determine which prospective jurors will favor their cause, and which will not)
[hereinafter cited as Divining Rod].
Both Wheeler and Soares, state court precedents for the result reached in McCray,
extended the right of inquiry to the prosecutor. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 277,
583 P.2d 748, 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,
488, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); see also State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d
481, 486-87 (Fla. 1984) (right to object to improper use of challenges given both parties).
" See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132; infra note 51.
, See, e.g., King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 495-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (trial
court accepted argument that challenged minorities sat apart from others, and were uncom-
municative on voir dire, leading counsel to believe that they would be unable to deliberate
effectively). The mere intuitive perceptions of counsel normally trigger the peremptory chal-
lenge. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 146. Thus, even when challenges are not used on the
basis of group affiliation, counsel may not be able to articulate a reason for their use, or
worse, he may feel the need to fabricate. See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1140 (Meskill, J., dissent-
ing). Short of such a result, it is submitted, genuine reasons offered by counsel may not
meet the subjective criteria of the individual trial judge.
'2 See supra note 51.
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the present peremptory challenge system have been suggested by
courts and commentators.5 3 These proposals include: eliminating
the peremptory challenge, 54 eliminating the prosecutor's challenges
while leaving those of the defense intact,55 reducing the number of
prosecutorial peremptory challenges relative to those of the de-
fense,56 and reducing the number of challenges allotted to both
sides.5 7
It is submitted that outright elimination of the peremptory
challenge is not the answer. The challenge has long been recog-
nized as an important tool of the trial lawyer .5  The reasons for its
endurance are strong-the inability of the challenge for cause to
eliminate nondemonstrable, latent biases, 59 and the potential that
" See infra notes 54-57.
Cf. King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (possible to
imagine acceptable judicial system in which no peremptory challenges allowed). See gener-
ally, J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 167-68 (elimination of peremptory challenges may be
appropriate, yet good reasons exist for retaining challenge); Comment, Curbing
Prosecutorial Abuse of Peremptory Challenges - The Available Alternatives, 3 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 223, 245-46 (1980) (although peremptory system may need to be abolished due
to abuses, this is unlikely to happen).
" See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 167; Brown, McGuire & Winters, The Pe-
remptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or
Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 192, 234-35 (1978). The prosecutor's job is not to secure convic-
tions, but to see that justice is done. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1131 (2d Cir. 1984).
Thus, the prosecutor has a duty to secure an impartial jury, not one that is prone to convict.
J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 167.
50 See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 169; Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 3, at 377. It
has been suggested that more than half of all prospective jurors do not believe that a defen-
dant is innocent until proven guilty. Salzburg & Powers, supra note 3, at 377. Reduction of
the number of prosecutorial challenges might help to offset this inherent advantage held by
the prosecutor. Id.
57 See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 169; Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 3, at 367-77.
Reducing the number of challenges allotted to both sides will allow the parties to retain the
benefits of the challenge, while denying either side the ability to change the cross-sectional
character of the jury to a great degree. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 169. Additionally, if a
party wastes challenges excusing jurors on the basis of dubious generalizations, he runs the
risk of excusing jurors partial to his cause, and reduces his ability to remove unfriendly
jurors. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 3, at 365. As the number of challenges decreases, this
"opportunity cost" rises. Id. at 376.
as Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-17 (1965). The Swain court noted the ability of
the peremptory challenge system to withstand criticism through the history of English and
American law. Id. The Court attributed this endurance to the "persistent.. .view that a
proper jury trial required peremptories . . . ." Id. at 213.
5, See id. at 219-20. During voir dire, counsel may, for reasons that would not support a
challenge for cause, come to feel that particular jurors will not be able to judge the case
impartially. See Note, supra note 5, at 1718. The peremptory challenge allows counsel to
excuse jurors suspected of harboring nondemonstrable biases, some of which may not be
apparent to the jurors themselves. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 3, at 354; see also Note,
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questioning veniremen during voir dire will be less probative be-
cause counsel may fear offending potential jurors."0
It is submitted that the second proposal-eliminating only the
prosecutor's challenges-is also an inadequate solution. Although
the state has no constitutional right to an impartial jury,61 if the
defendant is allowed to create a jury biased in his favor, the adver-
sarial system will not function properly.6 2
The last two proposals, which involve a reduction of the num-
ber of challenges, seem to present good opportunities to minimize
abuse of the peremptory challenge.6 3 Nevertheless, it is submitted
that neither option directly addresses the core of the problem-the
fact that the prosecutor's advantage over a minority defendant
flows from the proportional underrepresentation of the minority
group on the venire.
6 4
A UNIFORM PROPORTIONAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE SYSTEM
It is suggested that a uniform act be drafted to give the defen-
dant a share of challenges equal to the total number of available
challenges minus that percentage which his minority group com-
prises in the community from which the venire is drawn. For ex-
ample, if a defendant belongs to a minority group constituting one
supra note 5, at 1720 (peremptory challenge means of eliminating unconsciously biased
jurors).
60 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. Questions asked by counsel during voir dire may often
offend jurors and thus create hostilities when none had previously existed. Id. The peremp-
tory challenge permits counsel to question jurors thoroughly without risking the possibility
of having to try his case before a juror he has antagonized. Id. at 219-20. Thus, the peremp-
tory challenge helps ensure an uninhibited voir dire, and therefore promotes the attainment
of overall impartiality. See id.; Note, supra note 49, at 422-23.
e See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. Only the defendant is guaranteed an impartial jury by
the sixth amendment. See id. However, the state has a strong interest in trying the accused
before an unbiased jury. See Note, supra note 5, at 1719.
62 See Note, Divining Rod, supra note 49, at 58 & n.16.
6' See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. If the number of prosecutorial chal-
lenges is reduced, the ability of the prosecutor to eliminate an entire group from the petit
jury decreases. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 169. Had the prosecutor in McCray's
second trial been limited to less than eight peremptory challenges, it is possible that Mc-
Cray would not have been tried by an all-white jury. See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1115. Some
commentators argue that the defendant's challenges should be limited in the same way be-
cause defendants may be equally prone to use the challenges for unacceptable reasons. E.g.,
Note, Divining Rod, supra note 49, at 73. Historically, however, the peremptory challenge
has been a tool designed primarily for use by the defendant. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3,
at 147. If the number of challenges for both sides is reduced, it is argued that the defendant
should still have a greater number than the prosecutor. Id. at 169.
4 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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quarter of the population of the community, he would be entitled
to three quarters of the total number of challenges; the prosecutor
would receive the remaining one quarter.65 The chance that a pros-
ecutor could systematically eliminate members of the defendant's
group from the petit jury would be dramatically reduced; in fact,
his opportunity to exclude them would be balanced by the defen-
dant's opportunity to challenge members of the majority.6
A modified McCray inquiry could be implemented by the de-
fendant if his group is not recognized under the proposed act, or if
a prosecutor successfully challenges all minority veniremen despite
such an act.6 7 The defendant could raise the same prima facie case
as in McCray, but the prosecutor, it is suggested, could be allowed
to rebut the inference of unconstitutionality with a showing of an
absence of systematic exclusion of veniremen on the basis of group
65 At first glance, a proposal dividing the number of challenges between defendant and
prosecutor based on a quota system may appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's prohi-
bition of racial quotas in the affirmative action context. See Regents of the Univ. of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (1978). In Bakke, the Court asserted that classifications that
favor the members of one racial or ethnic group over another are inherently suspect. Id. at
291. The Court held that, absent prior legislative, administrative or judicial findings of past
or present discrimination against the group being favored by the classification, such classifi-
cations violate the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 291, 307-
09. However, in Bakke, the Court faced a selection system that used racial criteria to help
minorities "at the expense of other innocent individuals." Id. at 307. It is submitted that,
unlike traditional quotas, the proposed peremptory challenge system does not give rise to
reverse discrimination; non-minority defendants are not burdened by the system because (1)
their pre-existing challenge rights are not reduced, (2) they do not normally need the pro-
tection provided minorities under the proposed system because they do not face the same
danger of prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges, and (3) they will have the benefit of
the statute's protection when on trial in a community in which their own ethnic group is a
minority.
66 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The ideal challenge system would give
each party the same ability to excuse jurors thought to be partial to the other side. Id.
However, it is clear that parties often use challenges on the basis of group affiliation. See J.
VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 155-60. Indeed, empirical studies have shown that this is more
the norm than the exception. One study has shown that in all criminal trials conducted
during a two year period in one federal court, 68.9 percent of the prosecutor's challenges
were used against black jurors, despite the fact that blacks represented only one quarter of
the venire. Id. at 155. In some of the cases often cited as following Swain, the defendants
presented data tending to show that prosecutors were eliminating minorities from juries on
a wide scale. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1977). In
Newman, the Public Defender's Office conducted a statistical analysis of challenges in the
relevant district, and found that the overall exclusion rate for minorities was 69.5%. Id. In
United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976),
the defendant presented statistical evidence that during one year in a particular federal
district, the prosecution challenged 81% of the black veniremen peremptorily. Id.
6'7 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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affiliation over a period of time.68 Although this showing resembles
the defendant's prima facie case under the equal protection analy-
sis of Swain,69 it is suggested that, under a sixth amendment anal-
ysis, such evidence will be at least circumstantial evidence that the
prosecutor has not systematically excluded minorities in a particu-
lar case. Moreover, it is submitted that unlike the subjective analy-
sis of "reasons" proposed by McCray, analysis of statistical data
would allow trial courts to rule on an objective basis.
CONCLUSION
Although the practical effect of McCray is a marked departure
from the rule of Swain, the conflict between the two decisions is
more apparent than real. Swain protected the right of a cognizable
group to participate in the judicial process.70 McCray focused on
the rights of the individual defendant to an impartial jury. Both
cases rest upon sound applications of constitutional analyses.
It is submitted that the solution proposed by the Second Cir-
cuit in McCray does not fulfill its intended mission. Rather, the
revision of peremptory challenge statutes to bring them in line
with the purpose of the peremptory challenge system, together
with a modified McCray-type inquiry in extreme cases, could pro-
tect both the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury and the integrity of the system.
Ralph W. Norton
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 240 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Goldberg argued that the burden should be placed on the state to refute
involvement in discriminatory jury selection since the state "is a party to all criminal cases
and has greater access to the evidence, if any, that would tend to negative such involve-
ment." Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 227 (1965).
70 It is suggested that organizations representing allegedly excluded groups may have
standing under Swain to mount equal protection attacks upon discriminatory prosecutorial
peremptory challenges. The McCray court argued that despite the impossible standard of
Swain, prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges on a wide scale may indeed be violat-
ing the equal protection rights of minority groups. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1121; cf. Carter v.
Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1970) (class action against state jury commission for
alleged discriminatory jury selection practices).
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